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1 Introduction 
In this note we reflect on the case of Afriforum v Malema1 through a tentative 
engagement with systems theory. Various systems theorists, most prominently 
Niklas Luhmann,2 have described law as an autopoietic system. By this they mean 
that law is a self-referential system that isolates itself from the complexity of its 
environment and deals with problems in a highly selective and instrumentalised 
manner. An important aspect of this description of law is how law, because of its 
fear of having justice challenge its legitimacy, has effectively severed contact with 
the demand of justice.3 It is submitted that one way in which the relationship 
between law and justice could be reopened is if law's temporality could be revisited 
and accordingly other aspects neglected by law such as identity, agency and 
ultimately justice reconsidered. 
We clarify and expand on this below with reference to the facts and decision of 
Afriforum v Malema,4 that after more or less two years of contention was settled 
outside of court. The case is a good example of an instance where the court had to 
deal with an account of history that stretched beyond the immediate facts at hand 
and where law's narrow approach to time limited the factors, narratives and contexts 
to be taken into account. 
The section directly below deals with the facts and the decision of the case, 
whereafter we focus on arguments concerning the limits of the law and complexity. 
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1  Afriforum v Malema 2011 6 SA 240 (EqC). 
2  Luhmann Law as a Social System. 
3  Luhmann Law as a Social System 22. 
4  Afriforum v Malema 2011 6 SA 240 (EqC). 
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2 Afriforum v Malema 
Afriforum is a civic organisation particularly concerned with the protection and 
promotion of the Afrikaner community in South Africa. In 2011 it approached the 
Equality Court for an order prohibiting the then leader of the African National 
Congress Youth League, Julius Malema, from singing a particular struggle song at 
political rallies. The song in question is called "Awadubula (i) bhulu" or "Shoot the 
Boer". Afriforum claimed that singing the song caused systemic disadvantage for 
Afrikaners, undermined their human dignity and could propagate hatred and incite 
violence based on language, culture and ethnicity.5  
The songs were alleged to have been sung during the month of March 2010 on 
various occasions meticulously laid out to the court.6 Malema claimed that since it 
was a struggle song, he had the right to sing the phrases in question.7 He contended 
that the song referred to the symbolic destruction of white oppression, should not be 
taken literally, and was a part of the heritage of the liberation of South Africa.8  
The media's reaction to the case was significant. Especially after the song had been 
sung at the University of Johannesburg, articles appeared in all of the major 
newspapers.9 A large section of the public followed the press coverage and was 
outraged by the fact that the song had been sung. A common argument made in 
what the Court referred to as the "black press" was that the song was not an 
incitement to violence, but was sung in recognition of the past struggle and as a 
reminder of the need to oppose the current oppression of black people.10 More 
extreme opinions held that the considerations of oversensitive white fears should not 
                                        
5  Afriforum v Malema 2011 6 SA 240 (EqC) para 49. 
6  Afriforum v Malema 2011 6 SA 240 (EqC) para 49. 
7  Afriforum v Malema 2011 6 SA 240 (EqC) para 53. 
8  Afriforum v Malema 2011 6 SA 240 (EqC) para 61. 
9  Rademeyer Beeld. Also see Malan Beeld. 
10  Afriforum v Malema 2011 6 SA 240 (EqC) para 80. 
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have precedence over black aspirations.11 An interdict was granted against Malema, 
prohibiting him from the continued singing of the song, which he respected.12 
The court outlined the issues that it had to determine, including the meaning of the 
song's words, what meanings different groups ascribed to it, whether it constituted 
hate speech and whether the fact that it was part of a struggle heritage overrode 
the right of those claiming that it was hate speech.13 The court found that through 
the reporting and interpretation by the press the song's words had taken on a 
specific meaning to certain sectors. Whatever Malema's original meaning might have 
been, he had continued to sing the words after becoming aware that the words had 
taken on a character that the court considered "derogatory, dehumanising and 
hurtful".14 
The court emphasised that while the song was appropriate during the struggle 
years, the original figurative meaning of the song now seemed out of place. 
According to subsequent laws and agreements the enemy has become a friend and 
a brother and singing such re-contextualised words was out of order.15 The court 
decided that the words of the song could reasonably be construed to: 
... demonstrate an intention to be hurtful, to incite harm and promote hatred 
against the white Afrikaans speaking community ... 
and that it constituted hate speech, intention being regarded as irrelevant.16 The 
words were shown to have different meanings and each meaning was to be 
accepted. The judge stated that people who felt an attachment to the song should 
develop a new morality and embrace new customs in the new South Africa.17 In 
closing, the court declared that specific phrases of the song constituted hate speech 
                                        
11  Afriforum v Malema 2011 6 SA 240 (EqC) para 74. 
12  Afriforum v Malema 2011 6 SA 240 (EqC) para 76. 
13  Afriforum v Malema 2011 6 SA 240 (EqC) para 55. 
14  Afriforum v Malema 2011 6 SA 240 (EqC) para 107. 
15  Afriforum v Malema 2011 6 SA 240 (EqC) para 108. 
16  Afriforum v Malema 2011 6 SA 240 (EqC) para 109. 
17  Afriforum v Malema 2011 6 SA 240 (EqC) para 110. 
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and the respondents were interdicted from singing the song. The judge stated that 
morality should prohibit South Africans from singing it.18 
The respondents took the decision on appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal in 
Bloemfontein. However, on the 1st of November 2012 the parties reached a 
settlement agreement, which was made an order of court the following day, 
substituting the order of the Equality Court.19 The agreement stated that the song 
does in fact constitute hate speech and that the "morality of society" dictates that it 
should not be sung. This conclusion was reached on the grounds that the words are 
hurtful to some communities, and that the particular historical circumstances in 
which the song had its origin are no longer applicable.20 The decision to settle and to 
abandon legal proceedings was praised publicly.21 
In a critical discussion of the case, Joel Modiri22 reflects on the reluctance evidenced 
in the judgment to engage with the full implications of identity and the complex 
nature of the facts. Modiri relies on legal realism and critical race theory in order to 
expose the inherent ideological and racial bias embedded in the decision and in the 
legal structure at large. Our aim is to address this reluctance through the lens of law 
as an autopoietic system and the limitations that this places on law's ability to cope 
with identity and complexity. 
3 The limits of the law I 
As alluded to above, law as an autopoietic/self-referential system requires the 
drawing of boundaries; such a drawing of legal boundaries is clearly illustrated in the 
case of Afriforum vs Malema. Early in the case Lamont J issued the parties with a 
directive to isolate before the court what the legal issues were, the evidentiary and 
factual matters regarding the issues, and the extent to which the parties differed 
                                        
18  Afriforum v Malema 2011 6 SA 240 (EqC) para 120. 
19  Mediation Agreement Made and Entered into by and between the ANC and Mr Malema and 
Afriforum and TAU-SA (1 November 2012) (Politicsweb 2012 http://www.politicsweb.co.za/ 
politicsweb/view/politicsweb/en/page71656?oid=336778&sn=Detail&pid=71616) (hereafter the 
Mediation Agreement). 
20  The Mediation Agreement. 
21  See Afriforum v Malema 2011 6 SA 240 (EqC) para 80. 
22  Modiri 2013 SALJ 274. 
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with regard to them.23 The implication of this directive for the purposes of 
autopoietic law is clear. In a complex matter such as this, one that encompasses a 
broad temporal context and human communication, the court needed to know which 
of its own unique norms were at stake. This is the translation of environmental 
problems into the binary legal/illegal vocabulary of simple legal oppositions. Systemic 
operational memory had to be informed of exactly which norms to recall in order to 
assess what was at stake in a strictly systemic sense. Once the specific norms had 
been identified it became easy to establish which parts of the narrative fell within 
the ambit of the law and which do not. The complexity of the problem immediately 
became reduced to the fulfilment (or not) of a small set of norms, ignoring active 
engagement and dialogue. 
One result of this is the denial of the fully-fledged identity of the parties. As the 
leitmotif of systems theory goes: "human beings do not and cannot communicate - 
only communication can".24 How can hate speech be dealt with in a system that has 
this as a foundational premise? Paul Ricoeur's25 notion of narrative time can be 
recalled as a notion that forces us to deal with the complexity of identity and the 
reclamation of subjectivity. It identifies speech (or singing for that matter) as a 
constituting element of the unchanging ipse identity.26 Individual bodies are held 
accountable for their speech over temporal distances, because narrative time can 
never be ethically neutral.27 Autopoietic legal systems, through identifying the 
relevant legal norm (hate speech) to measure the individual against, effectively 
disengages from the puzzle of extralegal norms of justice as well as removing the "I" 
that spoke the contentious words.28 The ipse narrative identity of the speaker 
immediately becomes irrelevant to law. 
There is also the matter of institutional, public or political identities. Law is of course 
one of these, but in this plot we have the ANC and its Youth League on the one 
                                        
23  Afriforum v Malema 2011 6 SA 240 (EqC) para 44. 
24  Moeller Luhmann Explained 5. 
25  Ricoeur Time and Narrative. Also see Dowling Ricoeur on Time and Narrative. 
26  Rasmussen "Narrative Identity and the Self" 159. 
27  Dowling Ricoeur on Time and Narrative. 
28  Moeller Luhmann Explained 83. 
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hand, and Afriforum and the other complainants on the other. These political 
organisations both fashion themselves as spokespeople for entire cultural groups, or 
at least for their own members, each with different social imaginations of the good 
life. In a case such as this one, the normative claims of both the individual identity 
as well as the political identities of Malema and the larger political entities need to be 
assessed. Political identity is an identity that focuses not on common humanity but 
on differences. The political identities on either side of this case have an ideological 
claim that their rights in question are stronger than those of the other. 
Narrative forces these different identities to engage not only with the other but with 
themselves to re-evaluate what this identity means. If the law strips away the ethical 
character of identity it makes itself incapable of enacting justice. In a case such as 
this where temporal considerations impart meaning to the facts over a span of 
decades (or even centuries) it is irresponsible to be temporally insensitive, thus 
disregarding the value-judgments that narrative time demands. Autopoietic legal 
systems disregard individuality on both the individual and political level, regarding 
society as a homogenous mass. The parties to this case are labelled "complainant" 
and "respondent", and each is given legal roles with rights and obligations that are 
evidentially proved either true or false. The facts of this case are clearly in conflict 
with such a position. 
In autopoietic systems humans cannot be said to act, but instead it is always the 
system that acts (acts themselves being communicative events). Thus an element of 
causality becomes lost in translation when it crosses the boundary from environment 
to system. Environmental events enter the system, forcing it to make selections. The 
facts are internalised as difference, and law itself decides what the causal 
implications are. The moment a complex case, with a vast possibility of future 
outcomes such as this one, crosses the boundary we are left with a very limited 
amount of outcomes. Importantly these outcomes are almost necessarily legal 
outcomes. This allows for improper outcomes to be logically explained. Action loses 
much of its complexity when described through the designations of legal causality. 
The facts of the case at hand are particularly intricate, but the facts are typified as 
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follows: the song had been sung, the press widely printed translations, Malema 
became aware of this but continued to sing the song. In a nutshell this is what 
remains of the action and causation as the court saw it.29 
A pre-narrative structure exists in which we can make sense of the facts of the case. 
This symbolic order imparts meaning to the identities, actions and contexts that 
make it understandable to us and imparts causality to it. We need to understand 
these narratives within the spatiotemporal context to make them part of a 
teleological whole. It is this that makes it possible to be evaluated and judged. The 
final part is the stage of interpretation known as refiguration. At this stage the 
individual nuances and prejudices of the interpreter come into play, such as his own 
experiences, his background or his culture. This implies imperfect knowledge on the 
part of the interpreter or judge, meaning that the facts of a narrative need to be 
struggled with in order to arrive at a good interpretative conclusion. 
Ricoeur30 sees human action as rooted in cultural reality, much as the causation of 
physics is rooted in the material world. This kind of causality is situated within 
narrative time. In the case at hand the judgment seems to be an a posteriori one 
with little regard to the a priori events of the narrative essential to the teleological 
understanding of the facts. The temporal distance to the past is never really 
overcome. Even though the past does not exist anymore, we still inhabit it. 
As stated earlier, the parties reached a settlement on the 1st of November 2012. 
While Afriforum celebrated the settlement for being superior to a court order (for 
reasons such as that court orders are difficult to enforce; that it would humiliate one 
party; and that it prevents constructive engagement between communities)31 the 
question is begged: why was the law chosen by the very same complainants as the 
norm-system in which to address the matter in the first place? 
                                        
29  A similar argument about the limits of the law, or the limits of the court to truly hear and listen 
to narrative has been made in the context of the Schubart park case. See Van Marle and De 
Villiers 2013 AFLJ 129-148. 
30  Dowling Ricoeur on Time and Narrative 54. 
31  The Mediation Agreement. Also see Malan Beeld. 
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Is it possible that law could never have been an adequate avenue in which to 
resolve this matter? The parties themselves certainly gave reasons as to why a court 
order would be undesirable, and it appears that the parties have realised that law 
seems incapable of dealing with this complexity. Law could only translate the 
problem into a binary opposition where the song was either legal or illegal, where 
one party lost and the other won. In a case such as this, where the issue at stake is 
the peaceful and respectful co-existence of two race-groups (at least that is how it is 
portrayed by their self-appointed representatives) and the recognition of one of the 
groups' heritage of liberation (again as portrayed by the respondents), a simple legal 
prohibition seems like a fundamentally inadequate measure to appease the matter. 
This problem is one that required dialogue, temporal sensitivity and respect for the 
narrative identity of the other. This would have allowed for ethical considerations to 
come to the fore. Justice cannot be achieved and is simply incompatible with a 
system of communication that is temporally biased toward the present, denies 
identity and refuses to engage with norms that do not suit its agenda. 
4 The limits of the law II 
One of the problems of autopoietic reasoning is that it immunises itself from external 
critique. It is capable of this escape act through its self-drawn boundaries and 
differentiation. It becomes easy for law to reject criticism as not being directed at 
law itself, as if saying "you might be right, but what you are talking about is not 
law". One possible solution to this counter is to make sure that we are talking about 
law, that is, to establish a location for criticism inside the system itself. Is it possible 
for critique to infiltrate a system in such a manner at all?  
One possible argument supporting such an internally-located space for critique is 
offered by Christodoulidis.32 While he frames his argument within Luhmann's system 
theory of the political, and is even dismissive of the potential to employ it within the 
law, some fundamentals are translatable. The aim is to make a system "reflexive", 
allowing a degree of self-consciousness and self-distance that makes judgments of 
                                        
32  Christodoulidis 1991 Economy and Society 380. 
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the system possible by the system. This circumvents the escape act of designating 
critique as incompatible or not with the system.33  
Systems draw boundaries that allow them to differentiate external information and 
to turn this into meaning particular to the system.34 The system creates 
representations of reality that are meaningful within these confines. These different 
systems become increasingly separated from one another until they are autonomous 
and incompatible to the point where one can no longer perform the function of the 
other.35 One of the reasons for this is the important constitutive difference that 
makes up each system, the binary judgment code of each system such as 
legal/illegal or just/unjust.  
This allows a construction of the environment that is typified uniquely by each 
system. It structures the discourse in which a system can communicate about 
human events.36 So while a system is operatively closed in that it reconstitutes itself 
through its own past operations, it is this differentiation of reality that is said to 
make a system cognitively open. This gives the system the ability of self-observation 
in that it can distinguish between its environment that it makes subject to it as well 
as the internality of its own autopoietic operations. It is this point that 
Christodoulidis37 is interested in: the connection between operation and self-
observation. This self-observation is defined as the application of the differentiating 
code and an indication of something on that basis.38 It is exactly this self-awareness 
that lies at the root of boundary-drawing. 
It is possible for a system to recognise a third value separate from its binary code in 
the form of information that the system cannot process and thus falls to the 
wayside. This is a contingency value in order to asymetricise itself, which in the case 
                                        
33  Christodoulidis 1991 Economy and Society 381. 
34  Christodoulidis 1991 Economy and Society 382. 
35  Christodoulidis 1991 Economy and Society 383. 
36  Christodoulidis 1991 Economy and Society 383. 
37  Christodoulidis 1991 Economy and Society 384. 
38  Christodoulidis 1991 Economy and Society 384. 
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of law could be called justice.39 It allows for a degree of sensitivity for external 
reference from the system. Since autopoietic systems cannot directly observe their 
environment, this becomes a gauge for the fulfilment or disappointment of the 
system. When the system observes its environment (albeit through vastly reduced 
complexity) it decides to make the environment subject to its operations, which then 
gives it an opportunity to observe itself. It can also be called the "re-entry" of the 
system/environment distinction into the system.40 This sensitivity of the system, 
however, remains subject to what its binary code allows it to understand and deem 
relevant. 
Justice insists that it should be done, for example through re-entry, and that we can 
always attempt to act justly. It allows us to question what is legal and how the law 
should be. It is the very thing that should allow us to redefine what legal 
communication is. Justice as such, however, cannot allow itself to be channelled into 
the existing scheme of the system. It ultimately remains an external value, and upon 
entry into the system it loses some of its character and gains a legal definition. 
Part of the problem is that systems each create a unique environment relative to 
itself. The result is that society has no "centre" from which law and justice can 
deliberate. There cannot be a whole of self-knowledge.41 There is no environmental 
locus for collective rationality, since it is undermined by the incompatible system 
accounts of reality. In the case of law, it becomes reflected upon from the meta-
level of politics in order to establish its limits. The question then arises, which 
problems should be taken up again by law, and which should be distributed to other 
systems?42 The problem becomes a circular one: in which way is the political system 
more suited to deliberating these problems than the law is? Yet this meta-level of 
deliberation has made its way into political and legal systems, for example in the 
forms of constitutions. Given the binary code of systems, how are these meta-level 
deliberations supposed to be understood? The answer is that the distinction can be 
                                        
39  Christodoulidis 1991 Economy and Society 385. 
40  Christodoulidis 1991 Economy and Society 386. 
41  Christodoulidis 1991 Economy and Society 388. 
42  Christodoulidis 1991 Economy and Society 393. 
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placed through theory into the context of another distinction.43 The code that 
decided what was meaningful to the system can now be reflected upon. It is exactly 
through this meta-level that critique finds leverage from and can be carried into the 
systemic discourse itself. Law can question its very legal/illegal binary and realise 
that not all problems have to be differentiated and designated in this way. This could 
result in a different way in which the system perceives and presents the reality of its 
environment.44  
The third contingent that allows observation also allows for the possibility of seeing 
how things could be different. The meta-level of theory in the system allows for a 
second-order observation. Theory can see what is visible and invisible to the first-
order observation,45 brought about by the third "rejection value".46 It allows law to 
reject the very choice between legal/illegal, of whether problems should even be 
taken up legally. Is it possible for this rejection value to call to norms of justice, of 
narrative time and of ethics? 
Justice, however, demands temporal sensitivity. One of the ways in which law has 
shirked its responsibility is by being presentist. Law's relationship with memory and 
the forgetting that accompanies official memory is something that Christodoulidis47 
also discusses. Memory after all is important for all temporal locations including the 
future. As he writes: "[W]hat future does not seek its point of departure in some 
origin in the past?"48 Can we ever begin anew while being temporally sensitive, or 
does a new future necessitate a forgetting of the past? Even Ricoeur49 says that new 
generations feel the need to distance themselves from the "old Terror" of those that 
came before. It allows the new generations to wipe the slate of hereditary debt. Can 
this be done at the price of historical continuity? After times of crisis newer 
generations seek a split with the communal narrative, unable to carry the burden 
                                        
43  Christodoulidis 1991 Economy and Society 394. 
44  Christodoulidis 1991 Economy and Society 394. 
45  Christodoulidis 1991 Economy and Society 395. 
46  Christodoulidis 1991 Economy and Society 395. 
47  Christodoulidis "Law's Immemorial" 207. 
48  Christodoulidis "Law's Immemorial" 207. 
49  Christodoulidis "Law's Immemorial" 208. 
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that it imposes. Is it possible to free the future from the legacy of the past, and 
what role does the law have to play in this? 
The preamble of the South African Constitution gives a special role to memory, 
urging to remember the injustices of the past. Christodoulidis50 characterises this as 
a responsibility that we can never truly meet. He remains sceptical of the integrity of 
memory in an institution that "closes down memory ideologically".51 He evokes 
memory as an "immemorial", what can be remembered only as being forgotten. He 
makes important statements regarding memory: that memory is necessarily 
selective; memory is released from sequence and jumps, cuts and moves in 
chronology, also implying omission; and that memory is never presented as pure 
reality, but is constructed in the light of a question in order to illuminate the what, 
who, where or how of the past.52 It is thus always presented with reduced 
complexity in service of certain presuppositions. In this manner even law can deal 
with the past only through certain questions and goals, thus establishing what is 
remembered and what is forgotten, what is memory and what is immemorial.53  
Christodoulidis54 criticises philosophy for not having dealt with time in terms that are 
its own, time instead always being related to something else such as physical 
change. Such causal theories of time are problematic, since time is needed for 
causal events to unfold; it becomes tautological to use these events to then define 
time. This echoes the sentiment of Ricoeur, who wishes to break away from the 
internal/external debate regarding time. Yet how can we define time if not through 
causality? Christodoulidis offers a definition very similar to that of Luhmann. Time is 
defined self-referentially as the difference between past and future.55 This means 
that time doesn't need events or change to be constituted, and allows for different 
versions of memory for individuals. Lacking the substantive element of causality, 
memory needs a frame of reference, which it finds in the differentiation between 
                                        
50  Christodoulidis "Law's Immemorial" 212. 
51  Christodoulidis "Law's Immemorial" 212. 
52  Christodoulidis "Law's Immemorial" 213. 
53  Christodoulidis "Law's Immemorial" 214. 
54  Christodoulidis "Law's Immemorial" 215. 
55  Christodoulidis "Law's Immemorial" 216. 
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events, keeping in mind that memory is structured through some specific question or 
angle of inquiry.56 The past cannot be accessed without memory, automatically 
linking it with time and narrative time. 
Of course memory is never neutral and even legal memory has an "institutional 
imprint".57 Law structures memory with the same questions that access the past, and 
in this case these questions will have a certain legal character. Even the way that 
time is engaged with and how past events are defined are predetermined by the 
legal system. While narrative time allows us to look at time teleologically, law is a 
structure of a posteriori. Law needs to manage the past in order to stabilise social 
expectations.58 These expectations do not cast a fixed version of the past, and can 
thus be reinterpreted. Yet this memory will always be selective. The very functioning 
of the legal system requires that the past be classified, stripped of ambiguity and 
then settled and closed. Law is interested in reading the past only insofar as it can 
be rejected or accepted in the present in an act of constant constitution of the 
system and its reality.59 This makes a true engagement with the past impossible. 
Christodoulidis60 believes this can be changed through "... asking the system to 
remember what it forgot and to remember that it forgot". 
Through shared interpretative experience, a common memory can be built. Law is 
one interpretative model that attaches value to certain aspects and discards others 
as unimportant. To remember the past through the law side-steps the terminology 
of ethics.61 As we have said before, the individuality of an ethical agent is replaced 
by the homogeneity of the legal subject. Any call of justice toward the Other 
becomes lost. 
What does this mean for collective memory? How can someone take on the 
memories of another, never mind that of an entire population? Law has developed 
                                        
56  Christodoulidis "Law's Immemorial" 217. 
57  Christodoulidis "Law's Immemorial" 217. 
58  Christodoulidis "Law's Immemorial" 218. 
59  Christodoulidis "Law's Immemorial" 220. 
60  Christodoulidis "Law's Immemorial" 220. 
61  Christodoulidis "Law's Immemorial" 224. 
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mechanisms of abstraction and reduced complexity in order to facilitate this, such as 
being selective of which events are remembered, and by expressing only those 
events which can be cast in legal language. Law "sees" in its environment only that 
which it deems relevant, turning a blind eye on all else. This can never represent the 
whole truth and nothing but. Legal mechanisms all: 
... trivialise, professionalise and rationalise, and thus fail to represent the memory 
of suffering, fail to make familiar what is senseless.62 
Institutionally, law is embedded within the immemorial.63 
The parallels with the Afriforum case are obvious. While we did not see an active 
performance of a rejection value, the parties themselves seemed to have realised 
that their problems were too complex for a legal/illegal typification. One 
interpretation could be that the law was unable to identify this problem effectively as 
a non-legal one, and it took a few years for this fact to become apparent. 
Regardless, it seems that the parties were sensitive to the fact that a strictly legal 
resolution of the case would consign certain aspects of history to law's immemorial, 
an officially sanctioned forgetting. It would also appear that the parties became 
more aware of the different questions they asked when framing the recent history of 
the song, giving them very different meanings in their recollections.  
5 Complexity 
We now turn to the late Paul Cilliers's engagement with complexity. Our argument is 
that law attempts to evade complexity by drawing strict boundaries between what is 
deemed legal or not pertaining for example to time, history and narrative. The 
common pragmatic counterargument to the criticism of law's reduction of complexity 
is to appeal to efficiency. Surely being more sensitive to time, identity, justice and 
ethics can only further bog down a court system that is already struggling to meet 
its demands? Wouldn't slowing down cases be in conflict with justice and good law? 
                                        
62  Christodoulidis "Law's Immemorial" 226. 
63  Christodoulidis "Law's Immemorial" 227. 
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According to Cilliers64 it is destructive to positively link the "cult of speed" with 
efficiency. He argues for slowness because it will help us to deal with complexity 
better. It is a radical stance that recognises the importance of the past and memory 
in looking toward the future. It is an example of the ethical temporal neutrality that 
doesn't only emphasise present results but underlines the knowledge that the past 
and future carries. Speed is not a virtue for progress since "it is actually an 
unreflective fastness which returns you to the same place".65 
Contemporary society deems decisive action in the present as necessary to control 
the future.66 This has led to society losing its ability to retain the past.67 Technology 
has made it so that our private time has been overtaken by public time, the 
immediate response taking precedence over reflection.68 
Society needs the future to be predictable in order to plan its projects. Since we can 
never truly know what the future holds, the best way to control the future is to 
make it as similar to the present as possible, causing a state of the perpetual 
present.69 This is a denial of the very notion of temporality, despite our being 
temporal beings in a temporal environment.70 Spatial difference and temporal delay 
give structure to meaning.71  
Complex systems such as law are unavoidably situated in time but are also not 
symmetrical in time. They have pasts and futures that are not interchangeable.72 
Even autopoietic law has a kind of memory that carries past operations into the 
present and the future. Complexity needs memory to function. The relations 
between elements are maintained only if they are successful, and it is because of 
this that we can say that memory adds a measure of constitutive qualities to 
                                        
64  Cilliers 2006 Emergence 106. Also see Van Marle 2009 Verbum et Ecclesia. 
65  Cilliers 2006 Emergence 107. 
66  Cilliers 2006 Emergence 107. 
67  Currie About Time 9. 
68  Cilliers 2006 Emergence 108. 
69  Cilliers 2006 Emergence 108. 
70  Cilliers 2006 Emergence 108. 
71  Cilliers 2006 Emergence 108. 
72  Cilliers 2006 Emergence 109. 
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systems.73 Already this insists that systems are unavoidably situated in time and that 
memory is important for the evolution of the body of knowledge of law. It follows 
logically that the more we understand of the past, the better we can anticipate the 
future.74  
Since we know that memory cannot but be selective, the issue at stake is the 
principles on which autopoietic legal systems make such selections. When law is 
presentist, the future teleological significance of past events is ignored in the 
selection process, and good decisions cannot be made through fast selection. Law 
remains trapped in a fastness that leads to stasis, leading to its dealings with an 
environment that is disappointed in it. As Cilliers75 writes: "It is the anticipation of 
what it could yet mean which draws us forward". Slowness demands from us an 
ethic of time and reflection in order to separate noise from complexity.  
In this age it is considered more sophisticated to approach the law in a scientific 
manner. Whilst the scientific method has led to brilliant advances, as it has been 
applied by legal positivists it is an approach not suited to law. Scientific reasoning is 
necessarily reductionist and eschews and underestimates complexity.76 Law must 
ethically be considered as an interpretative discipline. Positivist claims of objectivism 
are a false appeal to legitimacy that ignores complexity and finite human knowledge 
and thus becomes a matter of ethics, and through its disengagement with ethics, an 
unethical position.77 Cilliers78 makes the distinction between modest and assertive 
claims of knowledge. Modest claims are ones that are reflective and careful about 
what they claim. When we are dealing with complex problems, we need to make 
modest claims rather than assertive ones, considering our limited ability to deal with 
complexity. In making assertive claims we ignore the contribution that slow 
reflection can make. This echoes the deconstructivist claim that meaning cannot be 
                                        
73  Cilliers 2006 Emergence 109. 
74  Cilliers 2006 Emergence 110. 
75  Cilliers 2006 Emergence 112. 
76  Cilliers 2005 Theory, Culture & Society 255. 
77  Cilliers 2005 Theory, Culture & Society 256. 
78  Cilliers 2005 Theory, Culture & Society 256. 
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reduced.79 Denying this difficulty and the limits of our understanding becomes an 
unethical denial of ethics. Modest claims are thus responsible claims. 
It has been shown that because of our finite knowledge of complex systems we 
have to engage with ethics when engaging with such systems. We know already that 
ethics simply cannot exist in isolation of narrative time. Complexity demands 
engagement from us that is sensitive to these elements. Our finitude means that we 
cannot calculate from a positivist vantage - instead it calls for creativity in our 
efforts.80 Law being a complex interpretive body of knowledge calls for this same 
creativity, but one limited by our responsibility towards modesty, justice, ethics and 
narrative time. 
A court order was never going to deliver justice in the Afriforum case. By its very 
nature it is too tainted by efficiency and rejects ethical modesty in favour of absolute 
statements. Justice is something that we must wait for.81 There is an ethical 
imperative for delay, to give attention to difference and to engage more deeply with 
the temporal aspects presented to us. It might be impossible to capture justice 
within a system,82 but attempting to deal with complexity in a fast and rushed 
manner will guarantee failure. 
6 Conclusion 
Luhmann's description of law as an autopoietic system proves to be true when 
viewed through the lens of the Afriforum case. While it may be accurate it is 
certainly not desirable. It illustrates how autopoietic legal thinking uses abstraction 
and instrumentality to neutralise aspects of problems that require thoughtful 
engagement. Through narrative time those aspects are again brought to the fore, 
and can force the law to engage in a manner that will allow it to consider justice as 
well as its own future improvement. 
                                        
79  Cilliers 2005 Theory, Culture & Society 259. 
80  Cilliers 2005 Theory, Culture & Society 264. 
81  Van Marle 2003 SAJHR 243. 
82  Van Marle 2003 SAJHR 251. 
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Law typifies its environment through forming a binary code in which it problematises 
all information presented to it, but a possibility of a third rejection value is possible. 
While it wasn't strictly speaking present in this case (other than perhaps in the 
dawning realisation of the parties themselves), it can be a vehicle for self-
consciousness in the legal system to identify when problems are suited to its code or 
not. Law deals with complexity through reduction and with the past through 
forgetting. It constructs an immemorial that allows present generations to break 
with those of the past. As we have seen with the struggle history at hand, in 
autopoiesis true engagement with the past is impossible because the law accepts 
only the information that aids in its reconstitution. Ricoeur describes responsibility as 
calling from the fragility of the Other,83 yet law does not allow us to act responsibly 
when it reduces the complexity of the environment and the past. In this case a 
solution resembling something of this responsibility seems to have prevailed over a 
legalistic one. 
Knowledge is taken from memory and projected and imagined upon the future in 
order to decide upon the most desirable course of action. The court failed to unleash 
the radical potential of recollective interpretation in the Afriforum case. It displayed a 
limited engagement with the past and effectively tried to settle the matter efficiently 
rather than to keep the debate open, allowing ourselves as well as the legal system 
constant exposure to the Other that could lead to more radical self-definitions. 
Complexity exposes our limits and therefore cannot be dealt with non-ethically. It 
implies that time must be a factor when dealing with the complex situations that law 
is presented with before it is reduced. This requires a degree of creativity and 
imagination from us when interpreting law. It cannot be done through a rushed 
process but instead demands patient contemplation from us. This was why a court 
decision was always going to give an unsatisfactory result in the Afriforum case. Law 
is not only too fast, but also gives too absolute and forceful answers to attempt the 
resolution of such complex problems effectively. Instead, justice requires of law to 
consider matters - especially ones as sensitive, intricate and important as the 
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Afriforum case - slowly and to give modest solutions that can always be re-
evaluated. As can be seen, the refusal of law to deal ethically with time has far-
reaching effects, but we cannot believe that they are inherent to law and that there 
aren't real steps we can take to make the law better. 
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